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Abstract — This manuscript proposes an efficient secret key 
cryptosystem based on polar codes over Binary Erasure 
Channel. We introduce a method, for the first time to our 
knowledge, to hide the generator matrix of the polar codes 
from an attacker. In fact, our main goal is to achieve secure 
and reliable communication using finite-length polar codes. 
The proposed cryptosystem has a significant security 
advantage against chosen plaintext attacks in comparison 
with the Rao-Nam cryptosystem. Also, the key length is 
decreased after applying a new compression algorithm. 
Moreover, this scheme benefits from high code rate and 
proper error performance for reliable communication. 
Keywords: Secret key cryptosystem; Code based 
cryptography; Polar codes. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION    
McEliece proposed the first public key cryptosystem based on 
t-error correcting goppa codes in 1978 [1]. The security of this 
cryptosystem relies on the fact that the general decoding 
problem of linear block codes is NP-complete [2]. McEliece 
cryptosystem has high speed encryption and decryption 
compared with other public key cryptosystems which are based 
on number theory such as RSA. However, McEliece 
cryptosystem has some weaknesses such as large key size and 
low code rate. 
Subsequently, Rao and Nam introduced a secret key 
cryptosystem based on Hamming codes with high information 
rate and short code length by keeping the generator matrix 
secret [3]. The Rao-Nam (RN) cryptosystem is insecure against 
some known attacks such as chosen plaintext attacks [4]. Many 
modifications were proposed based to RN secret key 
cryptosystem by either applying nonlinear codes in the 
structure of RN cryptosystem or modifying the set of allowed 
error vectors. However, most of them were shown to be 
insecure.
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In this paper, a new secret key cryptosystem based on polar 
codes over Binary Erasure Channel with erasure probability  , 
BEC( ), is introduced. The proposed cryptosystem is designed 
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to avoid the weaknesses in the RN secret key cryptosystem and 
is expected to provide more security and efficiency than RN 
cryptosystem. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In 
section 2, we give some basic preliminaries of the polar codes. 
Section 3 introduces the proposed cryptosystem. Efficiency and 
Security of the modified scheme are analyzed in sections 4, 5, 
respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 6. 
 
II. POLAR CODES 
Polar codes, introduced by Arikan, are a class of linear block 
error correcting codes that can achieve the capacity of 
symmetric Binary-input Discrete Memoryless Channels        
(B-DMC) with low encoding/decoding complexity. Consider a 
B-DMC        with binary input alphabet   {   }, 
output alphabet   and transition probability function  ( | ) 
such that     ,     . Let  (  ) denote the mutual 
information with uniform distribution on the inputs. If   is a 
B-DMC, then  (  ) is the symmetric capacity of the channel 
which measures rate. Let  ( ) denote the Bhattacharyya 
bound of a B-DMC   to measure reliability. These 
parameters take values in [   ] and it is expected that 
  (  )    iff  ( )    and  (  )    iff  ( )    [5]. 
In the polar codes, a set of      polarized binary-input 
channels {  
( )
      } with channel index     can be 
obtained by performing a phenomenon, called channel 
polarization, on   independent copies of a given B-DMC. 
This way, symmetric capacity parameters  (  
( )) of all 
polarized channels, except for a fraction of them, tend towards 
0 or 1 when   is large enough. Channel polarization consists 
of a channel combining step and a channel splitting step. In 
the channel combining step, a vector channel     
     is 
produced in a recursive manner by combining   copies of a 
given B-DMC  . In the channel splitting step, the vector 
channel    splits into   binary input coordinate subchannels 
  
( )                 [5].  
Let   be a  -element subset of {       } which is called 
an information set and let    be a complementary set of   
which is called a frozen set. In polar coding, the information 
set   is specified such that  (  
( ))   (  
( )
) or equivalently  
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 (  
( ))   (  
( )
) for all         . In other words, it is 
possible to construct    polarized channels called bit channels 
such that   (    (  )) of them, with channel indices     , 
are completely unreliable or noisy and   (  ) of them, with 
channel indices    , are reliable or noiseless [6]. The 
polarized channels are proper for channel coding by 
transmitting a sequence of   variable or information bits, 
   (      ), over the noiseless channels and transmitting a 
sequence of     fixed or frozen bits,     (      
 ), over 
the noisy channels [5].  
Polar coding is a code construction method that can 
achieve the capacity of B-DMCs such as the Binary 
Symmetric Channel (BSC) or BEC. To construct an (   ) 
polar code, the   bit-channels with the lowest corresponding 
Bhattacharyya parameters { (  
( ))      } should be 
selected. The construction method of the polar codes is 
efficient over Binary Erasure Channels because the 
Bhattacharyya parameters can be calculated efficiently with 
complexity  (  ) for these channels [5]. The generator matrix 
  ( ) of an (   ) polar code over BEC is a     submatrix 
of     [
  
  
]
  
 for any          and       
which is constructed as follows: 
1- Compute the vector of Bhattacharyya parameters of   bit 
channels    (               ) through the following 
recursion for                , starting with erasure 
probability of BEC,       . 
 
                          {
          
                    
      
                      
,            
 
2- Construct a permutation    (         ) of the set 
{       } so that, for any        , the inequality 
            is true. In fact,    and    are the indices of bit 
channels which have minimum and maximum values of 
Bhattacharyya parameters respectively. 
3- The generator matrix   ( ) is defined as the submatrix of 
    [
  
  
]
  
 consisting of the rows with indices 
          [7]. 
In nonsystematic polar coding schemes, an input block 
 ̅    
  (      ) which consists of information bits    and 
frozen bits     is encoded to codeword  ̅    
   ̅   
    ( )       ( 
 )      ( )    where       
   is a 
generator matrix of size   and    is a permutation matrix 
known as bit reversal. Also,   ( ) and   ( 
 )  are the 
submatrices of    consisting of the rows with channel indices 
corresponding to information set   and frozen set    
respectively. Since        ( 
 )  is a fixed vector, the 
encoder which maps    to  ̅ is nonsystematic [9].  
The codeword  ̅ is sent into channels which are obtained 
by  independent uses of   and the corresponding channel 
output  ̅    
  is received. Polar codes can be decoded by low 
complexity Successive Cancellation (SC) decoding algorithm. 
Let  ̂ 
  denote an estimate of the input block   
 . After 
receiving  ̅, the bits { ̂       } are estimated successively 
in the following way: 
 ̂  {
                                  
 
  (  
   ̂ 
   )              
 , 
 
where decision functions     
            , for all  
  
      ̂ 
         are as follows, 
 
  (  
   ̂ 
   )  {
                          
  
( )
(  
  ̂ 
   | )
  
( )
(  
  ̂ 
   | )
  
                                                 
, 
 
In fact, the decoder’s goal in the polar codes is to produce an 
estimate  ̂ 
  of   
  using the knowledge of information set  , 
frozen vector     and received vector   
 . We have block 
errors in the SC decoder if  ̂ 
    
  or equivalently if  ̂  
  . The computational complexity of encoding and the 
complexity of SC decoding are both  (     )  The upper 
bound on error probability under SC decoding for any B-DMC 
  and any selection of the parameters (     ) is as follows 
[5]: 
 
  (     )  ∑  (  
( ))   , 
 
Also, it is proved that reliable communication for polar codes 
over BEC with SC decoder is obtained when the following 
relation is satisfied [10, 11].  
 
                                      ( )      ⁄ ,                               (1)  
 
Where   is called scaling exponent and its value for 
transmission over BEC is         . Indeed, it is a tradeoff 
between the rate and the block length in the polar codes for a 
given error probability when we use the SC decoder. In this 
paper, the largest code rate which satisfies (1) is named by   . 
Table 1 shows the error probability variations of the polar 
codes with            over BEC (      ) in terms of 
various code rates. It is clear that error probability decreases 
significantly for      under SC decoding.  
  
TABLE I.  The upper bound on error probability,     ∑  (  
( ))    , 
of the polar codes with       over BEC(      ). 
        
0.9 922         
0.85 870         
       819         
   
0.75 768            
0.7 716             
 
III. PROPOSED CRYPTOSYSTEM 
In the proposed cryptosystem, we consider (        ) polar 
code with             over BEC with          ( )  
     to achieve high security and reliability in the RN secret 
key cryptosystem. Also, the value of        is obtained from 
inequality (1) as shown in table 1. 
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A. Secret Key 
The secret key is composed of the set { ( )        } which 
its elements are explained as follows: 
1. Let  ( )  {          } be a set of   secret channel 
indices which its elements are selected randomly from 
the     leftmost indices of permutation    (         ). 
The construction of    was explained in section 2. 
Therefore, the secret generator matrix of an (   ) polar 
code is defined as the submatrix of     consisting of the 
rows corresponding to the secret indices           . It is 
possible that such selection is not the best to achieve 
channel capacity but in this way, the generator matrix of 
the polar code is obscured properly from an attacker, as 
we will see in section 5. In fact, it is a tradeoff between 
security and efficiency that is almost inevitable in 
designing of the code based cryptosystems.  
2. Let     be a secret (   )-bit initial value (seed) of a 
Linear Feedback Shift Register, LFSR, to generate a 
sequence of      pseudorandom syndromes 
synchronously [12]. In this scheme, an (   )-bit 
pseudorandom syndrome     
    is considered as the 
frozen vector    . In encryption process of each plaintext 
block, the pseudorandom syndrome       which is 
employed by the sender must be known to the receiver 
synchronously.  
3. Let      be a regular sparse nonsingular scrambling 
matrix formed by   
  binary circulant     submatrices 
                       over   ( ) with row/ 
column Hamming weight      such that       [14], 
 
                   
[
 
 
 
 
              
              
 
     
 
     
 
 
 
      ]
 
 
 
 
 .                        
 
4. Let      be an     block diagonal permutation 
matrix formed by       submatrices       over GF(2) 
such that      , 
 
  [
       
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
]. 
 
The diagonal elements are circulant permutation 
submatrices and the other elements are zero submatrices 
in a way that the Hamming weight of each row or 
column is one [14]. In the proposed cryptosystem, we 
have                 for the (        ) polar 
code. 
 
B. Encryption 
1. The sender first randomly chooses a code in a family of 
equivalent (   ) polar codes over BEC( ) by selecting 
  channel indices randomly from the     leftmost 
indices of permutation   . Then, the generator matrix 
  ( ) is constructed in a similar way discussed in 
section 2. The generator matrix is defined as the 
submatrix of     consisting of the rows corresponding to 
the selected secret channel indices. Also, the authorized 
transmitter and receiver consider the set of selected 
channel indices,  ( ), as an element of secret key set. 
Then, the sender generates the pseudorandom syndrome 
      for each plaintext block using the LFSR and the 
secret initial value (seed)     
2. Finally, the plaintext is divided into  -bit blocks 
  (          ) and is encrypted as follows. 
 
  (    ( )       ( 
 ))        , 
 
where   (          ) is an  -bit ciphertext block, 
       ( 
 )     ( 
 ) is considered as an  -bit 
perturbation error vector and       ( )  [   
 ]   
                 is an encryption matrix. 
 
C. Decryption 
The authorized receiver decrypts the received vector     
      
         which is influenced by channel error 
   . The decryption process is performed as below. 
1. The receiver applies    to vector   and computes    
        ( )       ( 
 )      
 . In this case,     
  
is a vector having the same Hamming weight as    .  
2. By using the secret frozen vector     and the set of   
secret channel indices  ( ), the receiver eliminates     
  
and estimates  -bit vector       under SC decoding 
algorithm of the polar codes. At last,         is 
obtained.  
IV. EFFICIENCY 
To measure the efficiency of the proposed cryptosystem, we 
consider three factors: Error performance, key length and 
computational complexity. 
 
A. Error Performance 
In the proposed cryptosystem, we have reliable 
communication because; the secret channel indices            
are chosen randomly from the best     channel indices 
corresponding to the noiseless channels. Furthermore, the 
dimension of the used polar code and the parameters of the 
BEC are chosen in a way which satisfies (1). In this case, the 
upper bounds on error probability can be varied from    
    ∑  (  
( )
)     to        ∑  (  
( ))
   
         
 depending 
on the random selection of the secret channel indices. In the 
proposed scheme, the upper bounds on error probability can 
be varied from         ∑  (     
( ) )               
   to 
       ∑  (     
( ) )                
  .  
         The variations of the upper bounds on error probability 
for polar codes with       over BEC(    ) in terms of 
random selection of the set  ( ) and code rates      are 
shown in table 2. It is clear that unlike the upper bound    , 
the value of      is approximately invariable and is equal to 
∑  (  
( ))
   
   . 
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TABLE II.  The variations of the upper bounds     and     for the 
polar codes with      ,      over BEC(    ). 
            
0.75 768                       
0.7 717                        
0.65 665                      
0.6 615 7.881                   
 
B. Key Length 
The key size of the proposed cryptosystem is computed before 
and after executing key compression/decompression 
algorithms which are introduced in [14]. These algorithms are 
based on circulant block of submatrices in the structure of   
and   matrices. Without executing compression algorithms, 
we require to store   secret indices  ( )  (          ) 
instead of saving the generator matrix   ( ). Therefore, the 
upper bound of the required memory for storing the set  ( ) is 
  ( )      bits. The required memory for storing the initial 
value of an (   )-bit LFSR is             bits. 
Furthermore, we require only the first rows of     
submatrices                         to store the sparse 
nonsingular scrambling matrix     . So, the required memory 
for saving matrix   is      
   bits. Also, the required 
memory for storing permutation matrices      which consists 
of    circulant permutation submatrices      on its diagonal is 
       bits. Therefore; the actual key length of the 
proposed cryptosystem is computed as follows: 
 
           ( )             
                                  (  
           )            .        
             
Here, we use compression algorithm   and decompression 
algorithm   for the nonsingular matrix   respectively to 
reduce the key length [14]. Similar algorithms can be applied 
to the permutation matrix  . 
 
Algorithm  
Input:  
 Sparse scrambling nonsingular matrix  . 
Output:  
 Compressed vector     
Algorithm: 
1. Consider a full zero vector    consisting of     
  
coordinates. 
2. for      to    do 
3. for      to    do 
4. Select nonzero positions in the first row of submatrix 
     from matrix  .  
5. Insert the selected positions from left to right in 
vector   . 
6. end for 
7. end for 
8. return    . 
 
In the proposed cryptosystem, the Hamming weight of each 
row/column of      submatrices is     So, the compressed 
vector    consists of     
  nonzero positions which involves at 
most          
  bits of memory. For compressing the 
matrices   and  , the sender should send a new characteristic 
vector     (          ) to the authorized receiver as an 
element of the secret key. So, by using the compression 
algorithms, the maximum required memory for saving the 
compressed secret key is computed as follows: 
 
          ( )                     
                      (        )                  .  
  
It is clear that the key length of the proposed cryptosystem is 
decreased by 35 percent after applying the corresponding 
compression algorithms to   and  . The intended receiver can 
decompress vectors    and    to obtain matrices   and  , 
using the secret characteristic vector     and the proposed 
decompressing algorithms. Here, we present decompressing 
algorithm for   , similar algorithm can be applied to   . 
 
Algorithm   
Input: 
   ,    . 
Output: 
  . 
Algorithm: 
1. Construct a full zero      matrix consisting of       
submatrices     ; 
2. Let    ; 
3. for      to    do 
4. for      to    do 
5. Select, the  th    coordinates of   , from left to right. 
6. Insert ‘1’s in the    positions of the first row of the 
     (the (   )
th
 submatrix of  ) corresponding to the 
values of the selected  th    coordinates. 
7. for     to     do 
8.       Shift the first row of         positions to the right.  
9. Insert  th shift of the first row in (   )th row of   
    . 
10.     end for. 
11. end for. 
12. Let      . 
13. end for. 
14. return  . 
 
The key length of the proposed cryptosystem is compared with 
the key length of the Rao-Nam cryptosystem in table 3.  
 
TABLE III.  Comparing the Key length of the Rao-Nam and the 
Proposed cryptosystems. 
Cryptosystem Rao-Nam  Proposed  
code Hamming polar 
(   ) (72,64) (1024, 768) 
Rate       0.75 
Key length          [15] Before Comp.             
After Comp.           
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Although the dimension of used polar code is much larger 
than the code length of the RN cryptosystem, the compressed 
key length of the proposed cryptosystem is about 48 percent 
shorter than the key length of the RN cryptosystem. 
 
C. Computational Complexity 
The Encryption/Encoding complexity can be expressed as 
follows [14], 
 
           (  
 )      (  ),     
                   
where     (  
 )     is the number of binary operations 
for multiplying  -bit vector   to encryption matrix   . Also, 
    (  )    is the number of required binary operations for 
multiplying  -bit perturbation error vector   to the 
permutation matrix  . The Decoding/Decryption complexity 
can be calculated as follows, 
 
         (  
 )           ( 
    ), 
 
where the number of binary operations for multiplying  -bit 
received vector to the transposed permutation matrix   is 
computed as     (  
 )   . The complexity of successive 
cancelation decoding of the polar code is      (     ). 
Furthermore, the number of required binary operations for 
multiplying the k-bit vector    to the inverse matrix     is 
obtained as     ( 
    )    . 
 
V. SECURITY 
In this section, we consider some attacks such as the Brute 
Force, the Rao-Nam, the Struik-Tilburg attacks which have 
been proposed against the RN cryptosystem.  
 
A. The Brute Force Attack 
In the Brute Force attack, all possible keys are checked 
systematically until the correct key is found. In fact, this 
attack is impossible, only if the size of the key space is large 
enough. In the proposed cryptosystem, the parameters of the 
key set { ( )        } are computed as follows:   
i. Since the transmitter randomly selects   indices from the 
    leftmost indices of permutation   , the number of 
equivalent polar codes is computed as follows: 
 
  (   )  (
   
 
)  (   ) (  (     ) )⁄   
 
So the involved code parameters produce a family of 
(        ) equivalent polar codes over BEC(    ), which 
is   (        )   
   . Therefore, there is large enough 
equivalent polar codes to resist against the Brute Force 
attack. 
ii. The number of perturbation vectors      ( 
 )  
     ( 
 ) is equal to the number of (   )-bit 
pseudorandom syndromes         
        . 
Hence, finding the perturbation error vectors is infeasible. 
iii. The number of nonsingular scrambling matrices      over 
  ( ) is as follows [3], 
 
   ∏ ( 
    )    
      
   . 
 
In our scheme, for       we have     
   which 
indicates an impractical preliminary work for an attacker. 
iv. The number of block diagonal permutation matrices 
satisfies    (  )
    In the proposed cryptosystem, the 
number of these matrices for           , is    
(    )     . So, finding the permutation matrix is 
infeasible in polynomial time. 
 
B. The Rao-Nam Attack 
The Rao-Nam (RN) attack is a chosen plaintext attack which 
takes place in two steps as follows [3]:   
 The encryption matrix    is solved from a large set of 
plaintext-ciphertext (   ) pairs. 
 The plaintext   is obtained from   using    obtained in 
the previous step. 
Let    and    be two plaintext vectors which differ only in 
the  th,           position. Let       
      and 
      
      be the corresponding ciphertext vectors 
whose difference is computed as follows: 
 
      (     ) 
  (     )    
  (     ) ,     (2) 
 
where   
  is the  th row vector of the encryption matrix   . Let 
     
      and      
       be two distinct 
ciphertexts which are obtained from the same plaintext   
whose difference is       (     ) . The  
th
 row vector 
of the encryption matrix    is given by   
        
(     ) . Therefore, every value of (     )  should be 
tested for (     )  of (2) to obtain   
 . This step must be 
repeated until all possible pairs of error vectors are tested. The 
number of distinct error vectors is     
    and the number 
of possible values of (     )  is 
(  
    )
 
. In this way, the 
complete solution of encryption matrix    must be obtained 
and verified, because the correctness of each   
  cannot be 
verified independently. The work factor of determining the 
encryption matrix    from RN attack is     ( (   ) ) for 
    
    [3]. Obviously, this attack is infeasible for the 
proposed cryptosystem with    
   . 
Also, according to [3], the Hamming weight of error 
vectors   should be approximately     to resist against 
Majority Voting (MV) attack. In [16], Meijer and Tilburg 
introduced Extended Majority Voting (EMV) attack which can 
be considered as the generalized the MV attack. It was shown 
that the RN cryptosystem is vulnerable to the EMV attack 
because of imposing Hamming weight constraint. The EMV 
attack is essentially optimal if the Hamming weight of error 
vectors is equal to   ⁄ . Therefore, in order to prevent the 
EMV attack, the error vectors have to be chosen randomly 
without any Hamming weight constraints [16]. In the proposed 
cryptosystem, there are no constraints on the Hamming weight 
of the perturbation error vectors to avert the EMV attack. 
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C. The Struik-Tilburg Attack 
The Struik-Tilburg (ST) attack is also a chosen plaintext 
attack that is described as follows [4]. First, an attacker needs 
to encipher arbitrary message   until all    distinct 
ciphertexts   {     
     }   
  
 are obtained. Then, a 
directed labeled graph   (    
 ) is constructed by 
cryptanalyst where each vertex of   is named by the 
corresponding ciphertext in   and each edge from vertex    to 
vertex    is labeled as follows.  
 
      (  
     )  (  
     )       , 
  
A set of permuted error vector differences is denoted by 
  
  {     }     
 
. Subsequently, the attacker constructs an 
automorphism group    ( ) so that the edges are invariant 
through all permutations on  . Then, message        
         , is chosen by the attacker where    is the unit 
vector with one ‘1’ in the  th position. Graph  
 
 (     
 ) is 
constructed for the message    by applying same procedure. 
Also, the automorphism   is selected randomly from    ( ) 
and    ciphertexts                  are obtained by map 
       in a similar way with            . The difference 
        is calculated as follows, 
 
         (   
       )  (  
     )    
   ̃    
 
 By this method, the   
  can be estimated with probability 
|   ( )|   because, there exists an automorphism   for which 
 ̃     . On the average, the attacker should construct 
|   ( )|  encryption matrices    before the correct one is 
obtained. Therefore; the required operations for calculating 
encryption matrix is  (  |   ( )| )  It is clear that if the 
value of |   ( )|       is large enough, then this attack will 
fail. Furthermore, the average expected number of attempts to 
obtain all distinct    are shown to be   ∑  (    )⁄
    
    
 (       ). The total number of ciphertexts required for 
this attack is  (        ) because this procedure should be 
repeated for the   unit vectors {  }   
  [4]. The work factor of 
this attack for the proposed cryptosystem based on 
(        ) polar codes is approximately  (    ). Also, since 
the number of error vectors for RN scheme is small, the work 
factor of ST attack for that scheme is approximately  (   ). 
Therefore, unlike the RN scheme, the proposed system is 
secure against the ST attack.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we considered possible inclusion of polar codes 
in a secret key code based cryptosystem. By selecting a set of 
  secret channel indices  ( ) randomly from the     leftmost 
indices of permutation   , one can construct a large family of 
equivalent polar codes which helps the proposed cryptosystem 
resist against the exhaustive search attack. Also, the key length 
of this scheme is decreased because of storing   secret indices 
instead of saving generator matrix and using the compression/ 
decompression algorithms based on circulant block 
submatrices of   and  . This cryptosystem is secure against 
chosen plaintext attacks such as the Rao-Nam and the Struik-
Tilburg attacks benefiting from large number of perturbation 
error vectors and proper choices of code parameters. 
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